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Abstract 
This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the 
start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We 
start with the argument – defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik 
– that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant 
redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the 
democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions 
have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to 
the international financial crisis, the ECB’s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the 
interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the 
sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond 
that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty 
provisions. 
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I. Introduction 
From 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a range of nonconventional monetary 
policies in its efforts to tackle the euro area sovereign debt crisis, a number of national banking 
crises and widespread economic stagnation/recession. These policies represent a radical 
departure from the ECB’s pre-crisis focus upon interest rates and money supply designed to 
meet its low inflation mandate established in the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, 
TEU). The central role played by the ECB during the sovereign debt crisis also attracted 
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considerable public attention. Both the economic impact and the legality of ECB 
nonconventional monetary policies became topics of considerable academic and public debate. 
Our contribution to this special edition on the ECB’s accountability since the outbreak of the 
sovereign debt crisis is to present the argument that the ECB’s use of nonconventional monetary 
policies significantly undermined both its democratic legitimacy and the legitimacy of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project more generally. 
The remainder of this introduction summarizes the most influential arguments that defend the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU) and, more specifically, the EMU project 
and the ECB’s role. It sets out the main premises of our argument. In the following three 
sections, we discuss how the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policies and the perception 
thereof increasingly undermined the traditional basis of its legitimacy: the clarity and 
transparency of the central bank’s mandate; the redistributive implications of its policies; and 
the non-politicization of its policy-making. This article concludes by summarizing how the 
strength of most of the key arguments that can be used to defend the ECB’s democratic 
legitimacy were weakened in the course of the crisis. We finish by discussing potential future 
developments that could work to reinforce ECB legitimacy. This article focuses upon the direct 
and indirect implications of the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policy but also considers the 
implications of the ECB’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), which is not a monetary 
policy tool. We lack the space to examine the implications of the ECB’s role in the so-called 
‘Troika’ – along with the European Commission and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 
which imposed fiscal policy reforms upon programme countries seeking European-level 
financial assistance.1 
The EU is often accused of having a democratic deficit, because the European Parliament (EP) 
and national parliaments are perceived to be too weak in a range of policy areas and because 
delegation to executive agencies (even further removed from parliaments) is high.2 These 
critiques have been countered by a number of authors who have come out in defense of the 
EU’s political system. Many of these counterarguments are particularly relevant for the ECB. 
Majone argues that the democratic standards that should be applied to the EU depend largely 
on the nature of integration: If the European project is viewed as comprising political 
integration, the standards should come close to those of a parliamentary democracy.3 If, by 
contrast, integration is mainly economic, then economics and politics should be ‘kept as 
separate as possible’4 and European policy-making should be depoliticized. In addition, Majone 
contends that criticisms of technocracy, non-transparency, insufficient public participation and 
limited mechanisms of control would equally apply to non-majoritarian institutions outside the 
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EU, such as national central banks and regulatory agencies.5 Majone argues that institutions 
such as the ECB are legitimate if their mandate is specified, their decision-making processes 
well defined, their decisions justified, the policy outcomes sound, and if they have the necessary 
expertise and a willingness to protect diffuse interests. In the case of the ECB, Majone perceives 
low inflation to be a clear mandate and considers ECB independence as necessary to overcome 
the diversity of national views on monetary policy.6 
Moravcsik shares the view that EU policy-making is technocratic and benefits from 
depolitization.7 He argues that the EU’s functions – for example central banking – have often a 
lower electoral salience and are also delegated by states to national central banks, courts or 
agencies in order to ‘insulate’ them from politics. In addition, the EU’s institutions are limited 
by narrow mandates and constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making, for example in the 
Council of Ministers. Moravcsik thus defends the high degree of ‘insulation’ of EU policy-
making,8 insofar as: 
Most EU policies are regulatory and economic with only limited (re)distributive effects. Most 
‘political’ policies (for example, migration) remain largely intergovernmental and draw their 
legitimacy directly from elected national governments. 
The EU lacks a range of more politicized competences, including fiscal priorities, social welfare 
provision and taxation. 
The political system with its multi-level structure, plural executive and distribution of power 
across several institutions is geared towards the protection of minorities. 
Legitimacy stems from a variety of sources, such as elected national governments and the EP. 
Semi-autonomous judges and technocrats require insulation to produce policy outcomes in the 
general interest based on expertise ‘in areas where most citizens remain “rationally ignorant” 
or non-participatory.’9 
Overall, neither Majone nor Moravcsik see the role of the ECB in EU monetary policy as a 
problem because they both perceive monetary policy as a policy area that should best be dealt 
with by experts in a depoliticized manner with powers delegated to them by elected 
governments. Even more remarkably, a number of authors who are concerned about the state 
of EU democracy and who find political participation desirable often only mention EMU in 
passing without problematizing the role of the ECB.10 However, the view that monetary policy 
can be depoliticized has been undermined by the euro area crisis, with Bellamy and Weale, for 
example, questioning the assumption of ‘the normative value of the depoliticization of 
money’.11 
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Therefore, in the following sections, we examine to what extent key arguments about the ECB’s 
legitimacy continued to apply in the context of the ECB’s policies during the sovereign debt 
crisis. Based on the literature, we identify three elements of the ECB’s legitimacy that need to 
be examined: 
 
• the presence of (and adherence to) a clear mandate assigned by national governments; 
• the absence of (highly visible) redistributive effects; 
• the low political salience of ECB policies. 
 
II. Undermining the clarity of the ECB’s mandate 
As discussed above, the ECB’s legitimacy is often seen as unproblematic in the literature, based 
on a firm assumption that its actions are framed by a clear and narrow mandate that had been 
defined by elected national governments in the process of Treaty negotiations. Top ECB 
officials have also frequently defended the legitimacy of its policy-making in these terms.12 The 
Maastricht Treaty and the Statute establishing the ECB and European System of Central Banks 
stipulate that the ECB must give primacy to the pursuit of low inflation, only after the 
achievement of which it can seek to achieve other goals, including economic growth. Second, 
the ECB cannot be a ‘lender of last resort’ for sovereigns (Member State governments) – a 
prohibition established by provisions blocking the ECB from monetizing government debt 
(Article 101 TEU, Article 123 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and 
the ‘no bail out’ rule (Article 103 TEU, Article 125 TFEU). The aim of the prohibition of 
monetary financing was to ensure ‘monetary dominance’ and exclude the possibility of ‘fiscal 
dominance’ – that is, a situation where Member State fiscal policy becomes so untenable that 
the ECB is forced into deficit financing.13 
It can be argued that the ECB strayed from its mandate by pursuing policies that may have 
undermined the central bank’s pursuit of price stability – although this is of secondary 
importance to our argument, especially given that inflation for almost all of the five-year period 
from early 2013 to early 2018 was well below the ECB’s official target. Second, and more 
significantly, ECB policy had in effect an indirect fiscal policy role, potentially contradicting 
the Maastricht Treaty’s prohibition of the monetization of Member State debt and ‘no bail-out’ 
rules. 
With the outbreak of the international financial and then sovereign debt crises, the inflationary 
effects of the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policies became the subject of intense 
disagreement among economists, governments and even ECB Governing Council members 
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(see below). For 2008 and in 2011–2012, euro area inflation remained well above the 2% target. 
The ECB argued repeatedly that its medium-term goal was consistently respected.14 These 
claims, however, did not stop criticism of the potential inflationary implications of 
nonconventional monetary policies from a range of credible observers.15 We argue that the 
economic reality of the inflationary impact of the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policy 
mattered less than the perception of potential inflationary impact for the central bank’s 
legitimacy. 
Debates initially focused on the inflationary impact of the ECB’s liquidity boosting measures 
– notably, the purchase of covered bank bonds – and the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) – specifically, the purchase of sovereign debt on secondary markets of those euro area 
Member States most at risk of default and facing high bond yields. The ECB consistently argued 
that the SMP would not create inflation – that it could ‘sterilize’ the purchase of sovereign 
debt.16 A number of economists argued that the amounts involved in the debt purchases were 
very small in relation to the ECB’s overall operations.17 Nonetheless, the ECB’s repeated 
insistence upon ‘sterilization’ was an important political message directed notably at the 
German government, central bank and population that the bank’s actions would not create 
inflation.18 The political salience of low inflation was particularly significant in Germany given 
both the population’s longstanding inflation aversion – and prioritization of low inflation over 
other socioeconomic goals – and the Christian Democrat Party’s longstanding efforts to 
associate the EMU project with the pursuit of low inflation and broader macroeconomic policy 
stability.19 Thus, the economic argument that the SMP did not in itself fundamentally 
undermine inflation was less important than the very real perception that it could do so – 
especially if widened to include the sovereign debt of a larger range of Member States. The 
diversion from the pursuit of low inflation thus, in itself, politicized ECB monetary policy for 
a large section of the German political class and public (see below). 
The repeated inability of the ECB to neutralize fully the inflationary impact of its sovereign 
debt purchases through ‘sterilization’ fueled scrutiny and criticism. Between October 2010 and 
May 2011, the ECB failed five times to neutralize fully the inflationary effect of its debt 
purchases,20 revealing the tensions between the two ECB goals of ensuring euro area stability 
and combating inflation and attracting criticism from the German Bundesbank among other 
interested parties. The extension of ECB sovereign debt purchases to Italy and Spain from 
August 2011 undermined further the thrust of the ECB’s anti-inflation message and caused 
considerable frustration throughout the German political class (see below). The failure to 
‘sterilize’ bond purchases continued into 2012 but came to assume less political significance as 
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euro area inflation eased and then dropped below the 2% target from late 2012. Later when 
inflation dropped well below target, the ECB justified Quantitative Easing (QE) as a mechanism 
to raise inflation21 – and never in terms of supporting the purchase of sovereign debt which the 
QE policy included. The ECB’s communications strategy was to place emphasis on its treaty-
assigned primary goal and the legitimacy of its controversial nonconventional monetary policy. 
 
III. The redistributive implications of ECB monetary policy: on national fiscal policy, 
savers and financial systems 
Four elements of ECB monetary policy since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 
can be seen as having had significant fiscal implications, indirectly contradicting the Maastricht 
Treaty’s prohibition of the monetizing of Member State debt and of ‘bail-out’ – the Securities 
Markets Programme (SMP), the Long Term Repurchase Operations (LTRO), the announced 
but yet to be activated Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, and Quantitative 
Easing (QE). With the exception of the OMT programme, both the transparency of national 
fiscal and macroeconomic policy and the strength of national structural reform efforts were 
undermined. 
In response to rising sovereign debt yields in a number of Member States and notably Greece, 
the ECB adopted the SMP (2010–2012). The logic behind the policy was that by purchasing 
the sovereign debt of specific euro periphery Member States on secondary markets, the ECB 
would help bring down debt yields, thus enabling governments to fund themselves at lower 
rates. Economic studies22 suggest a short-term effect of the SMP, notably in terms lowering 
yields. The ECB made clear publicly that it would hold these bonds to maturity – without 
revealing those maturities. Under the SMP, the ECB purchased approximately €220 billion 
worth of Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish government bonds. The SMP was widely 
criticized for breaking the ban on the monetary financing of debt and transforming the ECB 
into, de facto, a ‘lender of last resort’. The Bundesbank held firm in its opposition. Jens 
Weidmann publicly queried the legality of the ECB’s de facto ‘monetary financing’ of debt as 
contrary to EU Treaty provisions.23 In 2012, Peter Gauweiler, the deputy head of the Bavarian 
Christian Social Union, joined with Bruno Bandulet, Roman Huber, Johann Heinrich von Stein 
and the German political party Die Linke to bring a case against the ECB to the German 
Constitutional Court that was subsequently referred to the European Court of Justice.24 
In early August 2011, the ECB stepped up – considerably – its sovereign bond-buying 
programme, extending this to cover Italian and Spanish government debt. The shift was 
important because, the SMP was extended to lower the bond yields not only of ‘Programme 
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countries’ – that is, the three euro area Member States that were subject to macroeconomic 
policy programmes managed and monitored by a ‘Troika’ of the ECB, the European 
Commission and the IMF – but also of two countries that were not subject to ‘Troika’ 
involvement. Thus, through the extension of the SMP, the ECB acted as a de facto ‘lender of 
last resort’ without the quid pro quo of fiscal/macroeconomic policy constraint. Jean-Claude 
Trichet performed a delicate balancing act, insisting publicly that the ECB was not a ‘lender of 
last resort’ and that the SMP was not driven by the goal of maintaining government solvency 
but rather was a ‘temporary and limited’ measure adopted for monetary policy reasons and, 
specifically, the need to restore a better transmission of the bank’s interest rate decisions – a 
claim made necessary for legal reasons.25 The SMP was ended in September 2012 when the 
ECB announced its OMT programme. 
The ECB engaged in Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), at a very attractive 1% fixed 
rate and full-allotment basis, meaning that banks had significantly increased access to central 
bank liquidity, on the basis of the provision of adequate collateral. However, collateral 
requirements were in turn eased a number of times and, moreover, the maturity of LTROs – 
originally of only three months – was lengthened, to six months and then one year. Then the 
ECB engaged in two massive LTROs in December 2011 and February 2012 which amounted 
to approximately €1 trillion. The effect of the LTROs was that euro area banks – especially 
those in the euro area periphery – borrowed funds to purchase sovereign debt with higher yields 
– notably the debt of periphery governments. In addition to contributing very directly to the 
dangerous sovereign debt-bank doom loop, the ECB’s LTRO operations effectively helped to 
lower sovereign debt yields by increasing demand, thus allowing the cheaper financing of 
governments. 
On 26 July 2012, ECB President Mario Draghi announced that the ECB would do ‘whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro’, with the aim of reducing bond yields for a number of euro area 
countries. This was followed in September 2012, with the announcement of the OMT 
programme which consists principally of a promise to conduct unlimited interventions in 
secondary sovereign debt markets to purchase the sovereign debt of a euro area country on the 
condition that its government accepts the conditions of a European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF)/European Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme. Officially, the ECB justified this 
policy in terms of safeguarding the appropriate transmission of its monetary policy throughout 
the euro area. In effect, OMT allows the ECB to act potentially as a ‘lender of last resort’ in 
government bond markets.26 Draghi’s July announcement and the subsequent launch of the 
OMT programme contributed significantly to restoring financial market confidence, even 
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though no OMT was subsequently conducted (prior to the publication of this article in early 
2019). Officially, the ECB’s decision to replace the SMP by the OMT demonstrated the 
adoption of a more aggressive approach to conditionality. The OMT undermined less forcefully 
the ECB’s mandate – notably the primacy assigned to its pursuit of low inflation – in that 
unlimited ECB purchase of sovereign debt could only come with (promises of) significant 
national structural reform designed to help governments meet their macroeconomic 
commitments embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, notably on public spending deficits and debt 
levels. However, the OMT amounted to a significant unilateral extension of the potential fiscal 
policy powers that the ECB assigned to itself – albeit via the EFSF/ESM – without much 
consultation with Member State governments. Specifically, the ECB assigned itself influence 
over the imposition of fiscal and macroeconomic policy commitments upon governments and 
an indirect monitoring role – with the EFSF/ESM – of their progress in meeting these 
commitments. 
On 22 January 2015, the ECB launched its QE programme with a promise to buy, from March 
of that year, €60bn worth per month of mostly government bonds purchased on secondary 
markets until at least September 2016 – a total of €1.1 trillion. The programme was not 
completely new, in the sense that it included two existing programmes – the asset-backed 
securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), 
which were both launched in late 2014. Officially, the ECB sought to stimulate euro area credit 
markets (bank lending) and economic growth and to diminish the risk of deflation. It intended 
to continue the programme until it saw ‘a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is 
consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2 [per cent] over the 
medium term’.27 Yet again, the desired and real effect of ECB policy was to lower government 
bond yields – albeit this time throughout the euro area. Importantly, the impact on different 
Member State sovereign debt varied, with yields on German bunds already at historic lows. 
The perceived (distributive) impact of these policies upon savers and financial firms in a 
number of countries – particularly in Germany – became a major political issue. For the German 
federal transport minister, Alexander Dobrindt, ‘the disappearance of interest rates [created] a 
gaping hole in citizens’ old age preparations’, a particularly sensitive topic in a country with a 
rapidly ageing population.28 Negative interest rates undermined the core business models of 
German pension funds, life insurers and a large section of the German banking system – 
specifically small savings banks and cooperatives – which were legally required to guarantee a 
fixed rate of return.29 ECB President Mario Draghi fought back against this kind of criticism, 
arguing that the German government had to assume responsibility for the difficulties facing its 
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savings and cooperative banks, while the ECB’s legal obligation was to bring inflation closer 
to target.30 
 
IV. The political salience of ECB policies and their perceived redistributive effects 
As the ECB’s crisis policies pushed against the boundaries of its mandate, they became 
politicized in three ways. First, dissent within the Governing Council became increasingly 
apparent – exposing deeper fundamental divisions in the euro area. Second, a number of 
governments moved to politicize monetary policy. Third, the public took a greater critical 
interest in ECB policy-making and national political debate intensified. 
For the first time, the adoption of crisis policies resulted in public disagreement among ECB 
Governing Council members. Despite the ad personam rule assigned to Governing Council 
members, several from ‘Northern’ European countries expressed concerns with 
nonconventional monetary policies that corresponded closely to those of their national 
governments. Notably, they argued that these policies risked reducing pressures upon Member 
State governments – and above all those in the euro area periphery – to adopt structural 
reforms.31 Although the full details cannot be known because of ECB secrecy, a growing 
number of unilateral public announcements by specific Executive Board members and National 
Central Bank governors that criticized ECB policy can be seen as the clearest indication of 
discord.32 Bundesbank president Axel Weber and ECB Chief Economist, Jurgen Stark both 
resigned in 2011 because of their opposition to the SMP – Weber explicitly and Stark 
implicitly.33 Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann subsequently led the opposition to the 
ECB’s nonconventional monetary policies. He described sovereign debt purchases ‘as being 
tantamount to financing governments by printing banknotes’ and argued that the announced 
OMT Programme carried ‘the additional danger that the central bank may ultimately 
redistribute considerable risks among various countries’ taxpayers’.34 More generally, 
Weidmann argued that ECB action would have distributive effects – the opposite of what the 
surrender of national monetary policy and the adoption of an explicit low inflation goal in EMU 
were meant to achieve. 
The interest of governments, political parties and the general public in ECB monetary policy 
also increased from start of the sovereign debt crisis, at least in part due to the greater visibility 
of the impact – or at least the perceived impact – of this policy. On the one hand, the extremely 
low interest rates affected negatively some economic models. On the other hand, the provision 
of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to euro area countries unable to access bond markets 
gave the ECB considerable power to interfere directly in Member State macroeconomic policy-
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making and thus indirectly created distributive effects within countries. The ECB’s intervention 
in Ireland is a good example of the significant power that the central bank could wield in relation 
to euro area national governments in need of emergency funding. The ECB agreed to provide 
ELA to Irish financial institutions only if the Irish government sought a bailout from euro area 
Member States in November 2010 – which it did shortly afterwards.35 In addition, the ECB 
demanded that the Irish government accept fiscal consolidation and structural reform, and that 
it recapitalize and restructure Irish banks. Such ECB demands became more frequent as the 
sovereign debt crisis intensified in 2011 and were also made of non-programme Member State 
governments – notably Italy and Spain. The ECB’s decision to limit the level of emergency 
liquidity to Greek banks in June 2015 – forcing the Greek government to close banks and 
impose capital controls – put into the spotlight both the power of the ECB but also its exposed 
position as a non-majoritarian body with such power.36 The ECB Governing Council took the 
decision without warning at an emergency meeting on a Sunday and a week prior to the Greek 
referendum on bail-out terms. 
A number of euro area Member State governments publicly challenged ECB monetary policy. 
Criticism was not new. From senior French politicians – including the president – there had 
previously been regular criticisms of the low inflation-focus of the ECB when the euro was 
perceived to be too strong in relation to the dollar and other major international currencies, 
which had a perceived negative impact on exports.37 However, government criticism of ECB 
policy-making following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis was far greater and owed to 
both nonconventional monetary policies and the ECB’s role in the ‘Troika’.38 
The German government was loudest in its criticism of nonconventional monetary policies. In 
April 2016, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, and a number of other senior German 
politicians, called for the end of the QE programme and the policy of low interest rates given 
the claimed impact on pensions, savers and small savings banks and cooperatives.39 Schäuble 
specifically accused the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policies (notably QE) for 
contributing significantly to the rise of the German populist right-wing party (AfD). For 
Schäuble ‘excessive liquidity [was] more a cause than a solution to the problem’.40 
Third, European national publics and parliamentarians became increasingly aware of the 
salience of ECB policy-making and public debate intensified. Public awareness of the ECB rose 
from 71% in the autumn of 2007 to 85% in the spring of 2015. In the meantime, public trust in 
the ECB – almost always marginally lower than trust in the Commission and significantly lower 
than trust in the European Parliament – declined from a high of 53% in the Spring of 2007 to a 
low of 31% in the Spring of 2014.41 The trust:distrust ratio for the ECB was consistently 
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negative, reaching a high of 10 percentage points in the spring of 2015 – when the trust:distrust 
ratio for the Commission was no longer negative. In Germany, trust in the ECB (in the spring 
of 2015) reached 32% while distrust reached 54% for a record differential of 22 percentage 
points – the highest of any euro area Member State with the notable exceptions of Greece, Spain 
and Cyprus. Public demonstrations against the ECB were taking place above all in the countries 
most affected by austerity policies (notably Greece, Italy and Spain) and focusing principally 
upon the ECB’s role as part of the ‘Troika’.42 However, the violent demonstrations directed at 
the ECB in Frankfurt at the opening of its new headquarters in March 2015 provided the most 
mediatized evidence to date of public mistrust in the ECB and the politicization of its role.43 
Increased political salience is also reflected in the evolution of parliamentary interest in ECB 
policy-making, which rose markedly following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. The 
number of MEP written questions to the ECB president increased significantly. In the first year 
and a half of the European Parliament’s eighth term (to the end of 2015) there were 195 written 
questions to the ECB – significantly more than the number of questions during all of the seventh 
term (149 from 2009-2014) and more than three times the level of the fifth term (62 from 2004–
2009).44 During the 2009–2015 period, 31% of questions to the ECB focused on monetary 
policy, 9% on ‘economic governance and surveillance’, and 21% on the ‘Troika’.45 In debates, 
many national and European parliamentarians praised the ECB’s nonconventional monetary 
policies, but there were also strong voices of opposition and concern as to their distorting 
effects. In a resolution on the ECB’s 2011 Annual Report, the European Parliament warned 
‘that in the absence of proper conditionality, non-standard measures such as three year LTROs 
may fall short of producing the desired effects.’46 In a resolution on the 2012 Annual Report, 
the European Parliament stressed that LTROs ‘did not provide a fundamental solution to the 
crisis,’ expressed concern ‘about the transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments 
onto the ECB’s balance sheet as a result of the ECB’s decision to buy “unlimited” amounts of 
short-term government debt’ through the OMT programme, and noted the potential impact of 
very low interest rates which ‘may cause distortions in the business sector and harm private 
savings and pension plans.’47 
 
V. Conclusion 
Over the course of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policies 
blurred the boundaries of the central bank’s mandate and undermined the transparency of both 
its own monetary policy and the implications of this monetary policy for national 
macroeconomic policy. As a result of these changes, many arguments that had been used to 
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support the democratic legitimacy of the ECB’s policies became less obviously valid. Notably, 
the ideas that ECB independence is legitimate as it is framed by a clear mandate, that ECB 
policy-making is non-distributive and that it is technocratic and depoliticized were undermined. 
1. ECB independence is unproblematic in the context of a clear mandate. 
In the course of the crisis, the ECB’s mandate became stretched and blurred. While the ECB 
never officially renounced its original mandate, it adopted a number of monetary policies where 
it is clear that price stability was neither the primary objective nor the intended effect. Similarly, 
while the European Court of Justice ruled that ECB policies did not break the treaty provision 
that prohibits the monetary financing of sovereign debt, the ECB rubbed against the boundaries 
of legality on this matter. Moreover, the stretching and blurring of mandates and the use of 
justifications that appeared not to explain in full the objective of policies created a lack of 
transparency and reduced the ECB’s legitimacy. 
2. The ECB does not require close political oversight, as its policies are not 
(re)distributive. (Re)distributive effects are minor and secondary. 
The Treaty provisions on the primacy assigned to low inflation and the ban on the monetary 
financing and bail-out of governments clearly defined and delimited the ECB’s redistributive 
role. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, nonconventional monetary policies 
involved de facto ‘distribution’ to euro periphery countries – by lowering unsustainably high 
bond yields – albeit with no clearly defined ‘redistribution’ from other Member States. 
However, the impact of low and then negative real interest rates upon some national financial 
systems and savers created the widespread perception of a de facto redistribution. While 
changes in interest rates always have distributive effects, the move to negative real interest rates 
in a number of euro area Member States made those effects particularly visible. ECB action 
during the crisis also had potentially massive distributive implications among Member State 
central banks (and thus Member States) – which was contained within the Target II system. But 
this is a secondary consideration. Finally, the ECB’s role in the ‘Troika’ – not discussed in this 
analysis – and in relation to ELA had a direct impact on national fiscal policy and thus 
(re)distributive policies within Member States.48 We are left with an apparent contradiction. On 
the one hand, the ECB’s nonconventional monetary policy enabled euro area periphery 
governments to maintain levels of public spending – or to diminish these levels less than they 
would have had to – which had implications on social welfare provision, taxation and the 
pursuit of other structural reforms. On the other hand, the bulk of ECB communication on 
macroeconomic policy almost always pushed in favour of structural reform. 
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3. Delegation of decision-making powers to technocratic institutions is legitimate where 
policy outcomes require high levels of expertise, are in the general interest and are ‘in areas 
where most citizens remain “rationally ignorant” or non-participatory’.49 
ECB policy-making requires, without a doubt, high levels of expertise. But it is questionable 
whether this ‘area’ was one where most citizens remained passive – at least at the height of the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis. The legitimacy of both the ECB’s indirect fiscal policy role – 
through its nonconventional monetary policies – and direct fiscal/macroeconomic policy role – 
through its participation in the ‘Troika’ and ELA – were challenged publicly by ECB Governing 
Council members themselves, Member State governments, national and European parliaments, 
‘credible’ and controversial academic economists and legal scholars, and a number of other 
technocratic institutions – including the IMF. The extensive debates on ECB policy in the media 
and the rapid decline in public trust are also evidence of public interest in ECB decisions. The 
very notion of ‘the general interest’ in this ‘area’ remains problematic. 
The European Central Bank is at a crossroads. Its original mandate was to be an independent 
technocratic institution, the legitimacy and credibility of which was set in terms of its price 
stability mandate. However, from the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, ECB 
nonconventional monetary policies had significant, if indirect, impact upon the direction of 
macroeconomic policy in euro area Member States – and in a manner that contradicted the 
terms of the central bank’s delegation as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. In light of the 
political salience of these policies and their impact, it is questionable whether the independence 
of the ECB remains democratically viable. ECB policy-making became problematically 
controversial and politicized. The temporary absence of economic crisis in the euro area – at 
the time of writing in late 2018 – reduces the political focus placed upon the ECB and 
diminishes the political pressure for reform. With treaty reform unlikely, unilateral ECB efforts 
to improve its accountability to the European and national parliaments – in the context of 
broader efforts to reinforce the accountability of euro area economic governance – is the best 
we can hope for prior to the outbreak of the next crisis. 
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